This paper presents a GIS-based methodology to estimate damages produced by volcanic eruptions. The methodology is constituted by four parts: definition and simulation of eruptive scenarios, exposure analysis, vulnerability assessment and estimation of expected damages. Multi-hazard eruptive scenarios are defined for the Teide-Pico Viejo active volcanic complex, and simulated through the VORIS tool. The exposure analysis identifies the elements exposed to the hazard at stake and focuses on the relevant assets for the study area. The vulnerability analysis is based on previous studies on the built environment and complemented with the analysis of transportation and urban infrastructures. Damage assessment is performed associating a qualitative damage rating to each combination of hazard and vulnerability. This operation consists in a GIS-based overlap, performed for each hazardous phenomenon considered and for each element. The methodology is then automated into a GIS-based tool using an ArcGIS® program. Given the eruptive scenarios and the characteristics of the exposed elements, the tool produces expected damage maps. The tool is applied to the Icod Valley (North of Tenerife Island) which is likely to be affected by volcanic phenomena in case of eruption from both the TeidePico Viejo volcanic complex and North-West basaltic rift. Results are thematic maps of vulnerability and damage that can be displayed at different levels of detail, depending on the user preferences. The aim of the tool is to facilitate territorial planning and risk management in active volcanic areas.
Introduction
Assessment and management of volcanic risk are important scientific, economic and political issues especially where volcano threatens densely populated areas. When a volcanic event takes place, it is important to define the list of priorities of intervention, the responsibilities for each emergency operation and the resources needed (Marzocchi et al., 2012) . Moreover, during long periods of quiescence, populations living in active volcanic areas often tend to underestimate the risk, instead of improving their preparedness (Gregg et al., 2004) .
Risk assessment is based on hazard, exposure and vulnerability characterisation (De la Cruz-Reyna and Tilling, 2008) . A multidisciplinary effort is therefore required to combine these aspects into comprehensive risk management plans. Exposure quantifies the social, economic, environmental, cultural and strategic value in areas potentially impacted by a given hazard (Birkmann, 2013) . Vulnerability is the potential of exposed elements to be directly or indirectly damaged by a given hazard. Many definitions of vulnerability exist (Cutter, 1996; Cutter et al., 2003; Minciardi et al., 2005; Galderisi et al., 2008; Pascale et al., 2010; ENSURE, Del 1.1.1, 2011; ENSURE, Del 4.1.1, 2011; ENSURE, Del 5.3.3, 2011; Cutter, 2013) but, given the complexity of this topic and its wide range of applications, a common definition of vulnerability is still missing (Tapsell et al., 2010) . The physical vulnerability of buildings due to volcanic activity has been widely observed and studied, in particular in the last decades. In particular, the EXPLORIS project (Contract no. EVR1- CT-2002-40026 , http://exploris.pi.ingv.it/), focused on the expected impacts of explosive volcanic eruptions on population and building stock at active volcanoes (Vesuvio (Italy), La Soufrière (Guadaloupe), Sete Cidades (Azores Islands), Teide (Canary Islands, Spain), Soufrière Hills (Montserrat)). Results (Spence et al., 2005a,b; Martí et al., 2008a; Zuccaro et al., 2008) are valid also for similar active volcanic areas. More recently, the importance of other elements that constitute the infrastructural system (road network, electricity and water supply, energy production plants) was included in the vulnerability and impact assessment of volcanic impacts. The ENSURE project (EC FP7 Contract no. 212045, http://www.ensureproject.eu) focused on the definition and characterisation of different vulnerability types which contribute to the estimation of the systemic vulnerability (ENSURE, Del. 1.1.1). In fact, the concept of vulnerability has many dimensions (physical, infrastructural, social and economic) and their combination constitutes the systemic vulnerability (ENSURE, Del. 4.1.1). The framework proposed by ENSURE project included the estimation of all vulnerability types, related to several natural hazards. As a case-study for volcanic hazards, a vulnerability to tephra fallout, lahars and earthquakes was performed at Vulcano Island, an active volcanic island in the Eolian Archipelagous, Italy (ENSURE; Del. 5.3.3). Thus, ENSURE Project put the basis for a systemic vulnerability and impact assessment at active volcanic areas. Moreover, the framework pointed out the importance of social (literacy and educational level, presence of ethnic groups, etc.) and economic factors (presence and distribution of productive activities, GDP per capita and differences in income per capita at specific areas, regional/local productivity, etc.) and accounted for the presence of hazard zonation, vulnerability assessment and emergency plans that, increasing preparedness, facilitated vulnerability reduction. Biass et al. (2012) performed a vulnerability assessment to tephra fallout adopting a similar methodology to the area surrounding Cotopaxi volcano, Ecuador.
Impact assessment builds on exposure and vulnerability assessments and aims at estimating how the exposed elements are impacted, both at a physical level (physical damage) and at a functional level (loss of functionality). Traditionally, impact assessment of volcanic eruptions has been focused on physical damage to buildings and population. Quantitative impact assessment needs empirical data (observations, surveys, experiments) in order to produce quantitative results such as vulnerability curves (Spence et al., 2005a,b) . Impacts on population can be estimated by comparing expected buildings damages and population data (Spence et al., 2005a,b; Zuccaro et al., 2008) , as well as economic impacts (Zuccaro et al., 2013) . But, although a lot of work has been done to characterise impacts due to volcanic phenomena on buildings (Pomonis et al., 1999; Spence et al., 2005a,b; Martí et al., 2008a; Zuccaro et al., 2008) , there are only few examples of impact assessment of other sub-systems such as transportation, communication and basic service networks Stewart et al., 2009 : Wilson et al., 2012 Wardman et al., 2012a) . These works show that physical damages produced on infrastructures can produce cascading damage propagation, due to the interdependencies between infrastructures and socio-economic activities. For example, the disruption of the electricity supply network can cause the temporal disruption of strategic activities such as water potabilisation. At the moment, there are no examples of a multi-hazard impact assessment that accounts for all components of a complex anthropic system (population, buildings, infrastructures and socio-economic activities) and their physical and functional damage. This is due to many factors, and amongst them, the difficulty of gathering data on infrastructures and the lack of quantitative and laboratory studies on the physical vulnerability of components. In particular, the few existing studies on systemic vulnerability and impact of volcanic hazards are focused on tephra fallout, a phenomenon that produces a wide range of systemic impacts (Biass et al., 2012) . Loss of functionality is therefore an important aspect of the damaging process, for which further research is needed. Characterising and assessing the expected impacts at both physical and systemic scale is therefore important in order to support risk management strategies and improve preparedness.
The systemic approach supports and enhances both short and longterm risk management, allowing one to account for the interactions between elements and the cascading impacts of a physical failure on the system. Developing methodologies for systemic vulnerability and impact assessment is therefore a priority for the risk management plans in active volcanic areas. Here we propose an impact assessment methodology that, relying on a systemic vulnerability assessment, aims at accounting expected impacts of three main volcanic hazards (fallout, lava flows and pyroclastic density currents). The methodology is automated in a GIS-based tool for the estimation of expected damages due to the impact of different volcanic hazards on a populated area. As a case study, the tool is applied to an active volcanic area, the Icod Valley, in the island of Tenerife. This area, threatened by both the activity of the Teide-Pico Viejo vocanic complex and the two basaltic rifts (Martí et al., 2008a) , has already been considered as a target of a vulnerability analysis of building exposed to fallout hazard (Martí et al., 2008a) , providing building stock vulnerability data for the present study. In the first Section, we define the study area and its geological settings. Then we define the expected eruptive scenarios at the Teide-Pico Viejo volcanic complex, and perform an analytical simulation through the multihazard tool VORIS . The third part presents the proper methodology, constituted by exposure analysis, vulnerability assessment and damage assessment. All data management operations are performed using a GIS (Geographical Information System) program, ArcGIS®. We produce damage tables that associate a qualitative damage rating to every combination of hazard and vulnerability values. This operation is automated into the ArcGIS® framework to create a tool for the estimation of damage produced by explosive volcanic eruptions.
In the results Section, we present maps of the expected damages produced in the study area by the eruptive scenarios defined for the Teide-Pico Viejo volcanic complex. Results are discussed in order to underline the most significant aspects for the local risk management and identify the possible future developments of the tool.
Study area
Canary Islands are located approximately 100 km off the Northwest coast of Africa (Fig. 1a) . Tenerife island (Fig. 1b) hosts the biggest active volcanoes of the archipelago, the Teide-Pico Viejo volcanic complex. The study area (Fig. 1b) covers about 170 km 2 and includes three municipalities in the Northern part of the Island: Icod de los Vinos, San Juan de la Rambla and la Guancha, that also include smaller towns (Fig. 1c) . These communities, which account for more than 35,000 inhabitants, are located in a topographic valley created by a large sector collapse of the northern side of the former Las Cañadas Edifice (Bravo, 1962; Carracedo, 1994; Martí et al., 1997) . The choice of the study area is justified by the volcanic hazard zonation by Araña et al. (2000) . The northern flank of the volcanic edifice has a high probability of being affected by hazardous phenomena such as lava flows and tephra fallout from Teide-Pico Viejo, according to the hazard assessment made in previous studies (Araña et al., 2000; Martí et al., 2012) . Moreover, its peculiar topographic conditions (steep external flank of the volcano and low caldera border) make this area especially prone to landslides and lahars that may be triggered by heavy rains. There are evidences of landslides in the Northern flank of Teide (Ablay and Martí, 2000) . Although landslide and lahar hazard assessment is beyond the scope of this work, these phenomena are mentioned due to their strong potential impacts on population.
The extent of the study area is also influenced by practical consideration, and in particular data availability from previous studies. This area was, in fact, surveyed as described in Martí et al. (2008a) and vulnerability characteristics of buildings were used to assess the risk and exposure of population in the area (Spence et al., 2005a,b) . We use this previous information to assess expected impacts of volcanic activity on the built environment. Finally, the study area is based on the existing administrative boundaries for the three municipalities of Icod de los Vinos, San Juan de la Rambla and La Guancha. This allows accounting for the territorial competences in terms of socio-economic services (e.g. schools, hospitals) and infrastructures (e.g. roads, water supply) and producing results targeted on the local decision-makers.
Methodology

Eruptive scenarios
There is a great variety of hazards related to volcanism in Tenerife (Martí et al., 2008b (Martí et al., ,c, 2012 , corresponding to a wide range of magma compositions and eruption styles. The two main cases are phonolitic eruptions (associated with the central complex) and basaltic (mainly derived from the two active rift zones outside the central edifice).
Possible scenarios related to a reawakening of Teide-Pico Viejo are described by Martí et al. (2008b) , , who proposed long-term volcanic hazard event trees for Teide-Pico Viejo stratovolcanoes. According to geological studies, expected explosive scenarios at the central edifice would include Sub-Plinian to Plinian explosive eruption, with a high sustained column and occurrence of tephra fallout and pyroclastic density currents (García et al., 2010; Martí et al., 2012) . Such an eruptive scenario has a recurrence of several hundred to a few thousand years (Martí et al., 2012) and should be included in the risk assessment of Tenerife. The presence of basaltic rifts determines the possibility of lava flows and Strombolian eruption occurring in areas along these rifts, out of the central edifices (Fig. 1c) , or at their basis. The recurrence for these basaltic eruptions is of the order of several tens to few hundreds of years . Lava flows can also occur in the central complex, and in this case the expected composition is mainly phonolitic (Martí et al., 2008b) . Examples of phonolitic lava flows from the central vent and the caldera flanks are described in Carracedo et al. (2007) and Martí et al. (2008b Martí et al. ( , 2012 . Detailed information about the estimation of the probability of occurrence for the main volcanic hazards at Teide-Pico Viejo can be found in Martí et al. (2012) and .
In this paper, we define two eruptive scenarios for the Teide-Pico Viejo volcanic complex and basaltic rifts based on Martí et al. (2012) . These two scenarios are not comprehensive of all the expected activity at Teide-Pico viejo volcanic complex, but given that no comprehensive multi-hazard assessment is available for these volcanoes, they support a first-level impact assessment for the typical eruptive styles that may threaten the study area.
-Scenario 1: Sub-plinian eruption at central volcanic edifice. We consider an explosive eruption with a sustained eruptive column of 8 km, which produces ash dispersal in the atmosphere and tephra deposition at the ground. The eruptive column collapses into a pyroclastic density current, a hot mixture of gas and incoherent hot material (ash, pumice, blocks) that forms a gravity-driven cloud. A phonolitic lava flow from Teide-Pico Viejo flank is also associated to this eruption. The modelling strategy for this scenario is similar to the one considered in Martí et al. (2008a Martí et al. ( , 2012 and applied to the Montaña Blanca eruption (Folch and Felpeto, 2005) . A phonolitic lava flow from the from Teide-Pico Viejo flank is associated to this activity, as documented by Carracedo et al. (2007) and Martí et al. (2012) . -Scenario 2: Violent Strombolian eruption from a high-susceptibility point on the N-W basaltic rift (Martí and Felpeto, 2010) . This eruption is similar to El Chinyero Strombolian eruption (Romero, 1991) . We hypothesise a weak column (2-3 km high) and a basaltic lava flow.
The two eruptive scenarios are simulated using the VORIS tool , constituted by the integration of three analytical models for the simulation of, respectively, ash deposition, pyroclastic density current and lava flow. We address the reader to Felpeto et al. (2007) for a complete description of these three models and the VORIS tool. Input parameters used to simulate the two eruptive scenarios are synthesized in Table 1 . The reliability of modelling outputs (Fig. 1a) and the study area (1b). Note the location of the Teide-Pico Viejo volcanic complex, the caldera extent and the three basaltic rifts. Fig. 1c shows in detail the location of the three municipalities considered for the analysis and the main towns. strongly depends on the volcanological parameters introduced, as underlined by several authors, in particular for ash dispersal and deposition (Mastin et al., 2009; Bonadonna et al., 2011; Folch, 2012) . Environmental inputs can also change at different time scales: short (wind direction), medium (topography) and long (climatological). Here, real wind data was used to model ash dispersal, from a day when ash from either scenario would have impacted the study area, following Martí et al. (2008a) . Finally, the model parameters have to be constrained, to be coherent with the modelling inputs. For example spatial resolution used for lava flow modelling should have the same or lower resolution with respect to the digital terrain model, to prevent introducing additional uncertainties in the results. In this case, simulations of the lava flow and the pyroclastic density current have been performed on a DEM (digital elevation model) from the Spanish Geographic Institute (IGN) with 50 m of cell size.
Lava flows are simulated with a probabilistic maximum slope model (Felpeto et al., 2001 ) that gives as a result the probability of each cell to be covered by lava. Fig. 2a and c shows the probability for each cell to be covered by a lava flow, obtained fixing the probability of coverage at a conservative level of 0.1%. Many examples of probabilistic lava flow modelling in different active volcanic areas can be found in literature: Crisci et al. (1986) , Young and Wadge (1990) , Felpeto et al. (2001) , Felpeto et al. (2001) , Harris and Rowland (2001) , Costa and Macedonio (2005) , Favalli et al. (2005) , Herault et al. (2009 ), Favalli et al. (2009 and Tarquini and Favalli (2011) . Fig. 2b and e shows the ash fallout map containing value of ash vertical load .
Results of the modelling are raster maps, where each cell has an associated numerical value. In order to perform spatial operation with GIS, such maps have to be reclassified into a common qualitative rating. We defined a 5 class qualitative rating, ranging from very low to very high levels (I-V) valid for the three hazardous phenomena (Table 2) . Ash fallout is classified based on the critical thresholds for exposed elements ( Table 2 ). Given that we account for a wide range of magnitude of tephra fallout (from mm to m), we classify ash load in 5 wide ranges that correspond to the range of expected impacts on exposed elements. Moreover, the critical ash load threshold for assets or a community can vary within a wide range (Biass et al., 2012) due to the differences in tephra characteristics, weather conditions (wet/dry atmosphere), physical characteristics of elements and socio-economic development of the study area. For this reason, the calculation of ash thickness (which depends on ash density) is approximated (Table 2) . Finally, Fig. 2c shows the area potentially covered by the pyroclastic density current. The flows usually follow drainage paths and are very influenced by topographic conditions but its high kinetic energy can in some cases allow them to overpass obstacles, hills and ridges (Saucedo et al., 2005; Capra et al., 2008; Charbonnier and Gertisser, Fig. 2 . Results of the simulation of eruptive scenarios with VORIS tool for scenario 1 (top) and 2 (bottom) respectively. a) area having more than 0.1% probability of being covered by a phonolitic lava flow from the caldera flank, b) area covered by ash fallout produced by a Sub-plinian eruption at the central vent are displayed, c) area covered by a pyroclastic flow resulting from the collapse of the eruptive column. d) area having a 0.1% probability to be covered by a basaltic lava flow produced by a violent Strombolian at the N-W basaltic rift, e) area covered by ash fallout caused by the corresponding ash column. Ash load values are classified according to Table 2. 2008). The energy cone model, used in the VORIS tool, can be used to account for this phenomenon Toyos et al., 2007) as showed by Capra et al. (2008) for heavily diluted density currents at Nevado de Toluca volcano.
Exposure
Exposure analysis aims at recognising those elements that have to be taken into account for a risk assessment. A complete exposure analysis requires a wide range of data such as distribution of population, social and economical conditions, productive activities and their role in the regional economy. Due to the limited availability of data and the difficulty of obtaining data in GIS format for most of the socio-economic indicators, the list of assets considered in this work and corresponding subcategories (Table 3) is not comprehensive. Nonetheless, the aspects pointed out in the exposure analysis enhance the discussion of results and provide guidelines for future improvements of local data management. Fig. 3 shows the available data in GIS format, that support this work and allows producing a first-level impact assessment for the study area.
Available population data include national statistics at the municipality level (http://www.gobiernodecanarias.org/istac/) and a local population survey performed at the study area. According to recent national statistics, 32% of the population is older than 75 or younger than 15 years old (Instituto Canario de Estadistica, http://www. gobiernodecanarias.org/istac/, accessed 2012). Moreover, in 2012 Tenerife Island hosted more than 4 million tourists, most of them foreigners, 30% of them being older than 65 or younger than 16 years old (Istituto Canario de Estadistica, http://www.gobiernodecanarias. org/istac/, accessed 2012). The local-scale survey was conducted in 2003 (Fig. 3a , source: Cabildo de Tenerife) and is the last survey produced for the area at local scale. Knowing the distribution of population within the municipality supports a higher detail in the vulnerability and impact assessment analysis. Given that the total population in this area has not been significantly changing in the last decade (Istituto Canario de Estadistica, http://www.gobiernodecanarias.org/istac/, accessed 2012), this is a reliable source for this analysis.
The anthropic system, intended as the set of human-built features, activities and their relationships, has been divided into many subsystems: buildings, transportation system, and urban services (electricity network and water potabilisation, supply and sanitation). Most of the infrastructures and almost all types of buildings can be physically damaged by a pyroclastic density current, a lava flow or an abundant ash fallout. Exposed buildings considered in the analysis are displayed in Fig. 3b . The study area contains many residential buildings, some minor industrial buildings and strategic buildings (one hospital, one fire station, several schools and educational centres and churches and other religious buildings). In particular, main schools and churches may be used as shelters during an emergency. The road network (Fig. 3c) is constituted by few main roads and a dense network of urban and country roads, used by local people. The main road is the highway (Autopista del Norte) that connects Santa Cruz to Icod de los Vinos, but it does not reach the North-West of the Island. Urban services considered are electricity and water network (including potabilisation, supply and sanitation) (Fig. 3d) . The region uses groundwater extracted though water wells from the Teide slopes (http://www.aguastenerife.org/), a common practice in the area. Also, sea water is extracted and desalted. Fig. 3d shows the localisation of the main wells (connected to a tunnel dug in the flank of the volcanic edifice) and many minor wells (private use), not included in the current analysis due to the lack of detailed information on their use. A system of both open air and buried pipes connects water production nodes to the supply network. Desalination plants are also shown in the map.
An important component of the exposure analysis is the socioeconomic context. The disruption of economic activities due to a volcanic event could in fact impact all the society. The economy of Tenerife is mainly based on the tourism, but tourists are concentrated in the south of the island (Adeje, Arona), in the capital (Santa Cruz de Tenerife) and some minor towns in the North (Puerto de la Cruz and Santiago del Teide). Together, the other municipalities of Tenerife (including the study area) account only for a 10% of the touristic activities (Instituto Canario de Estadistica, http://www.gobiernodecanarias.org/istac/). Tourism is therefore not particularly relevant in this area at a general level, but given that many tourists visit Teide volcano, we will describe possible impacts on tourism for this case-study in the discussion section. Another important productive activity of Tenerife is agriculture. Tenerife exports fruits and vegetables (in particular tomatoes, potatoes and bananas). Main agricultural areas are located in the South of the Island and in La Orotava (North-East), whilst the study area sums up approximately 500 ha of cultivated land (http://www.agrocabildo.org/mapa_ cultivo.asp). Main crops in San Juan de la Rambla and la Guancha are banana and potatoes, accounting for more than 50% of cultivated land. Table 2 Classification adopted to quantify the hazard magnitudes. Ranges have been defined according to the output of the VORIS tool, and are used to reclassify the hazard maps. In particular, ash load ranges are based on the critical values that can produce physical damage to the main exposed elements. Given that the damage increases with ash deposition magnitude, it is implicit that elements damaged at a lower hazard level (for example, roads or electricity network) are also damaged at higher levels. Table 3 Exposed targets considered for the analysis, divided in 4 sub-systems (population, buildings, road network and urban services) and subcategories. Icod de los Vinos municipality hosts 115 ha of vineyard, accounting for the 16% of the total cultivated land of the municipality (http://www. agrocabildo.org/mapa_cultivo.asp), and has a relevant wine production activity. Agricultural activities, and in particular wine production, are therefore important for the study area. Regarding secondary and tertiary activities, only 762 of approximately 5000 companies in Tenerife are located in the study area (http://www.gobiernodecanarias.org/istac/) and no big industrial activities are present. Available socio-economic on agriculture and industrial activities do not provide enough information to carry out an exhaustive exposure analysis for the study area. We will nonetheless take into account the features surveyed in the building stock that have an important role for storing products that have a socio-economic value: industrial deposits and agricultural deposits (silos).
Ash fallout
Vulnerability
The aim of the vulnerability assessment is to quantify the physical vulnerability of the elements of each sub-system (buildings, transportation system and urban services) through the use of indicators. Each hazardous phenomenon affects elements and infrastructures in different ways according to their specific physical vulnerability. For example, roof type is not relevant in case of lava flow, but is the fundamental parameter for vulnerability of buildings to ash fallout. Physical vulnerability indicators are therefore defined specifically for each hazardous phenomenon and sub-system. First, data are grouped into three thematic vector maps, one for each anthropic sub-system (buildings, transportation system and urban services). The database used for the vulnerability analysis is in fact constituted by heterogeneous data from different surveys, which need to be synthesized into maps with the most updated knowledge on the area. For each sub-system, we define a physical vulnerability indicator and a corresponding qualitative vulnerability index. We then associate to each element its vulnerability index using ArcGIS® editing tools. This operation is automated within the GISbased tool. Secondly, having estimated the physical vulnerability of elements, we account for their relevance in the system and the interdependencies between elements. Systemic vulnerability accounts for the possible effect of local disruption on the whole complex system, constituted by all exposed and not exposed elements (people, buildings, transportation network, urban services, productive activities). An element may have a low physical vulnerability to tephra fallout, but be indirectly disrupted by the failure of a critical infrastructure. Pioneering studies on infrastructures' physical and systemic vulnerability directly or indirectly point out the relevance of network design for the verification and propagation of damage (Wardman et al., 2012a; Wilson et al., 2012) . Systemic vulnerability coefficients are therefore estimated by amplifying the value of vulnerability of those features that are recognized as critical for the entire system. Such coefficients are based on our considerations, but the tool is designed to be flexible and allow future changes. Moreover, we suggest these coefficient to be established by a multidisciplinary expert team.
Population
Population is potentially exposed to any volcanic hazard, but its vulnerability changes with respect to the different phenomena. Impacts therefore span a wide range of magnitudes and for example a substantial ash deposition can cause minor visibility or respiratory problems, whilst pyroclastic flows can cause death or serious injuries to people. In general, we assume that the higher the number of people in an area, the higher is the physical vulnerability of the area, due to the presence of a higher number of potentially injured people. But population vulnerability also changes when specific actions are taken, such as evacuation or sheltering in place. For example, young and old people are particularly vulnerable due to its reduced mobility. Also, tourists are more vulnerable due to their lower knowledge of the area (roads, people, language) and, sometimes, scarce access to information. Due to the lack of specific data on age, language and social characteristics, we consider all the population with equal physical vulnerability to volcanic hazards. But, knowing that 30% of the population belongs to this category (Section 3.2) we can hypothesise that 30% of the population has a higher physical vulnerability to volcanic hazards. This aspect is particularly significant for the analysis of results. . Maps of exposed assets, distinguished by main typologies: population (3a), buildings (3b), road networks (3b) and urban services (3c). Subcategories considered in the analysis (Table 3) are also displayed in different colours.
Buildings
Physical vulnerability parameters are based on available data (Spence et al., 2005a,b; Martí et al., 2008a) and previous studies on building vulnerability in other active volcanic areas (Baxter, 2004; Zuccaro et al., 2008; Wilson et al., 2009 Wilson et al., , 2012 Biass et al., 2012) . In particular, the vulnerability data and the methodology for buildings were obtained from Spence et al. (2005b) and Martí et al. (2008a) . The survey performed by Spence et al. (2005a,b) , in this area allowed collecting information on building and infrastructure typologies for an analysis of the vulnerability to the three main potential hazards (earthquakes, pyroclastic density currents and tephra fall) that could affect the area in case of reactivation of Teide-Pico Viejo volcanic complex. The survey area was divided into 6 zones, according to their different characteristics and use and the sites selected were specifically chosen to pick up the full variety of settlement types and ages. We therefore adopt the building type definition proposed by Spence et al. (2005b) for European buildings, which identifies 4 typologies of building structures and 4 typologies of roofs at Icod de Los vinos, as described in Martí et al. (2008a) . Classification tables are available in Spence et al. (2005b) and Martí et al. (2008a) . Given that the building stock survey has been performed in 2004 and no recent indicators on building maintenance status are available, and given the wide range of ash fallout magnitude considered (from millimetres to metres) and the wide range of critical ash load for building collapse (Biass et al., 2012) , we assume that all buildings are likely to collapse within high ash load values (Hazard level IV and V, Table 2 ). This assumption is justified in order to include all possible impacts of ash fallout in the methodology. Moreover, we account for the uncertainties related to both the vulnerability indicator for buildings and the critical ash load collapse for different typologies. Note that, if vulnerability data were available in higher detail, they could be easily included in the methodology by using 4 vulnerability values according to building/roof type. For example, new high-resistance, reinforced concrete buildings could be damaged only in case of ash fallout hazard level V (Table 2) .
Transportation system
Digital maps of roads, service infrastructure (water, electricity) and built environment for the island were provided by the Icod de los Vinos municipality and updated with the vulnerability information. To estimate the physical vulnerability of the transportation system, we use the parameter "road quality" (Table 4 ). Data contained in the GIS database are road typology, pavement type and geometrical parameters (width, slope).
Road quality depends on path quality (straight or curved), geometry (width, slope) and road surface characteristics and maintenance conditions. This parameter has been defined on the basis of the road design codes, such as AASHTO (American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials) policy on geometric design of Highways and Streets (AASHTO, 2001) . In Europe, road design is defined in the national codes of each country. The European FP7 project SAFESTAR (http:// www.transport-research.info/web/projects/project_details.cfm?ID= 670) focuses on road design improvements in the last decade. Road quality is relevant in case of ash fallout: a few millimetres of ash can disrupt road traffic on secondary, steep and curvy roads, whereas driving on a straight path may be still possible. Unfortunately, at the moment there are no studies that relate the type of road and vehicle to the expected disruptions of road traffic. Also, tephra fallout can decrease visibility and disrupt the ventilation and air conditioning systems of vehicles, which may cause additional disruptions and road blockage. Finally, low road quality can also increase the difficulty of evacuation, and pose additional threats to exposed people trying to escape from an impacted area (Cole and Blumenthal, 2004) .
Urban services
Urban services are extremely important during emergencies, and their disruption can cause secondary impacts on population and socioeconomic activities. There are only a few examples of vulnerability assessment of urban infrastructures in literature (e.g. Stewart et al., 2006; Wilson et al., 2009 Wilson et al., , 2012 Wardman et al., 2012a) and no specific vulnerability classifications of urban services and its elements for volcanic hazards are currently in use. The lack of specific data on the water and electricity distribution network (which is in general managed by private institutions) makes it difficult to assess the physical vulnerability of elements based on its characteristics. However, the GIS database provides the geographical location of the different urban services, the typologies of elements digitalised and a short description. This provides a basic but meaningful distinction into "type" categories (Table 5) , corresponding to alphabetic codes (for example, "El" for electricity line) in order to perform the following steps on the impact assessment analysis. Each element is therefore associated to its intrinsic physical characteristics, which are taken into account when estimating the expected damage.
Systemic vulnerability
Having estimated the physical vulnerability/damage of each element, we aim at considering their relevance for the complex system. The more relevant is an element for the system, the more relevant will be its physical damage for other elements and system. For example, if an element is considered strategic (for example, a hospital), then the system is more vulnerable to its failure, and the functional damage produced by its failure is higher. Here, we propose a set of coefficients that allow taking into account this aspect. A systemic vulnerability coefficient greater or equal than 1 has been assigned to each element (Table 6 ) based on its relative importance in the system. Vulnerability coefficients are based on few studies that suggest the relative importance of elements (Houghton et al., 2006; Spence et al., 2008; Barsotti et al., 2010; Sandri et al., 2011; Wilson et al., 2012) , past experiences of managing volcanic crises (Blong, 1984 (Blong, , 2003 Baxter et al., 2005) and recent considerations on sustainable risk management MIAVITA Handbook, 2012; Zuccaro et al., 2013) . However, given the complexity and subjectivity of this choice, they should be defined by a group of experts, and based on knowledge management methods such as elicitation techniques (Aspinall, 2006) . Given the fact that these coefficients are very subjective, we do not use coefficients lower than 1 (in order not to underestimate any contribution to the total vulnerability). Systemic vulnerability coefficient can be easily changed by the user.
The population is not only vulnerable to the physical phenomenon at stake (pyroclastic density current, for example) but also to the failure/disruptions of basic services such as electricity and water supply. Regarding buildings, the ones having the higher weight are the strategic buildings (hospitals and local health care centres, fire stations, schools and churches to be used as shelters), due to their role during an emergency. Roads have been classified based on their hierarchic role, Table 4 Physical vulnerability of roads, estimated by the path quality (depending on width, slope, road surface and conditions). If estimators are contrasting, the element is associated to the lower classification value. (Ryus et al., 2010) . The concept of level of service started to be applied in Europe in the last decade and is becoming more and more widespread. The importance of the highway here is stressed by the fact that there is no train or alternative transportation means in the area. Finally, it is extremely difficult to assess the relative importance of one infrastructure or another when dealing with basic services such as electricity and water supply. Wilson et al. (2012) suggest taking into account the hierarchical role of elements in the network, and distinguish between generation and distribution, which is a meaningful classification for both the water and electricity supply network. The ENSURE framework also introduces these aspects, and suggests taking into account the cascading impacts of failure on the depending infrastructures (ENSURE, Del 4.1.1, 2011). Here, we give higher priority to the electricity network due to its relevance in supporting emergency equipment (hospitals, fire stations) and operations. Given that the definition of emergency procedures relies on risk management experts and involved stakeholders (civil protection, national and regional government), this decision should be taken by an expert group.
Damage estimation
Physical damage quantifies the magnitude of physical harm on an element, which impairs its value, usefulness, or normal function. The functional dimension of damage is therefore implicit in its definition, as it quantifies the loss of functionality of elements, defined as the purpose that they are designed for, or expected to fulfil. Here, we identified 5 qualitative levels of functional damage, based both on physical damage and loss of functionality produced by a certain hazard on an element having a specific vulnerability (Table 7) . At lower levels, elements substantially maintain their functionality, whilst at higher levels, the functionality is lost. The choice of using 5 damage classes accomplishes the need for synthesis but also representativeness.
This general classification has to be adapted to all specific subsystem components, accounting for the specific context and their role in the system. The way one element can be damaged and loses its functionality, in fact, depends on the type of hazardous event and the characteristics of the element. We therefore produced damage tables to associate a certain combination of hazard and vulnerability values to a qualitative damage rating. Damage tables are based on past studies, observations and practical considerations. Given that no historical explosive eruption occurred in Tenerife (Martí et al., 2008a) , expected impacts of volcanic hazards were inferred by observations of impact at other active volcanic areas (Blong, 1984 (Blong, , 2003 Baxter et al., 2005; Jenkins et al., 2013) . Damage tables (Table 8) were produced for each hazardous phenomenon considered (ash fallout, pyroclastic density current and lava flows) and infrastructural sub-system analysed (buildings, transportation system and urban services). Damage tables associate to each hazard class (Section 3.1 and Table 2 ) and vulnerability characteristic of the elements (Section 3.3 and Tables 4 and 5) a damage level (Table 7) .
Pyroclastic density currents always produce a high degree of damage on the elements encountered on his path (Valentine, 1998; Gurioli et al., 2005) . It affects buildings with a lateral pressure on external walls which leads to window failure and eventually total collapse (Spence et al., 2004; Baxter et al., 2005; Jenkins et al., 2013) . Zuccaro et al. (2008) describe the possible injuries caused by a pyroclastic density current, based on Spence et al. (2004) showing that in case of window failure and temperature not high enough to cause building ignition, 15% of its occupants are injured and 15% die, whilst if the building burns, 45% of its occupants suffer strong injuries and the other 45% die. These injury models underline the high impact of a pyroclastic density current on the population and underline the importance of building design and measures such as the prior evacuation of threatened areas Table 5 Physical vulnerability classification for urban service systems. Each element has its specific vulnerability, and the rating is not related to the degree of vulnerability, but to the vulnerability characteristics typical of the element ("column type"). Each element is associated to a code (for example, "El" means electricity lines). (Zuccaro et al., 2008) . Some infrastructures, which are deeply buried into the ground, represent an exception, but even in this case it is impossible to guarantee the absence of damage, because some inspection wells can be poorly insulated and high temperature clouds can enter the wells (Howe, 2003) . To be pragmatic, we can assume that everything on the flow path is going to be destroyed or suffer strong physical damages and become useless. Finally, given the high velocity that can be reached by pyroclastic density current, in the order of several metres per second (Druitt, 1998; Cioni et al., 2004) , it is very difficult to avoid impacts and perform any mitigation action. For this reason the corresponding damage table contains only very high levels of damage. Lava flow does not commonly produce a high number of casualties, because its path is in most cases predictable and the flow velocity is commonly slow. Moreover, there are no evidences for lava flow causing direct injuries and burnings. For this reason, we assume that lava produces a low impact on population, and we associate to the population a low damage value (damage level I). But lava flow can indirectly impact population as it is likely to destroy everything on its path, producing maximum damages on buildings, productive activities and roads. In case of lava coverage, we thus associate to all roads, electricity network ("Ej", "Ep", "El", see Table 5 ) and surface elements ("Wd", "Wa", "Wt") a maximum damage level. The water extraction and supply network ("Wa", "Wc", "Wdn"), although usually buried, are associated to a medium damage level due to the fact that, if covered by lava, can be damaged in correspondence of inspection wells or other discontinuities. Other buried elements ("Sp", "Sc") are associated to a low, but not null damage level, in order to account for possible damage produced by high temperatures and infiltration, which depends on the physical characteristics and design of the elements. Examples of the expected impact of lava and pyroclastic density current on buildings and infrastructures can be found in Spence et al. (2004) , Capra et al. (2008) and Zuccaro et al. (2008) .
Tephra fallout can produce a wide range of impacts, in terms of both magnitude, and temporal and spatial extension. Moreover, the thresholds of ash fallout that can produce damages vary considerably, depending on socio-economic context and local conditions (Biass et al., 2012) . Impacts of ash fallout on people are documented for main explosive volcanic events (Blong, 1984; Baxter, 1999; Horwell et al., 2003; Horwell and Baxter, 2006) . Ash fallout does not produce chronic injuries or casualties, but it can cause eye irritation, reduction of visibility and respiratory problems (particularly for asthmatic or aged subjects). Also, resuspension of deposited ash can impact population and reduce air quality (Collini et al., 2012) . Here, we assume that a substantial ash deposition (hazard levels IV and V, Table 2 ) can produce substantial impacts on the population, corresponding to a medium damage level, whilst very low to low damage is associated to lower values of ash deposition. The main physical impact of tephra fall is the ash load on roofs, which can cause roof collapse and consequent injuries and even the death of its occupants. The work of Pomonis et al. (1999) defines the ash load thresholds for building typologies of Azores archipelago, which are similar to Canarian buildings. Spence et al. (2005a,b) provide vulnerability curves which allow a quantitative damage estimation for different building typologies. Biass et al. (2012) adopt values varying from 100 to 300 kg/m 2 respectively for weak and strong roofs, which
correspond to approximately 1 to 3 kPa. Spence et al. (2005a,b) propose tephra load collapse values of 3, 4.5 and 7 kPa, respectively for weak, medium and strong roofs in Tenerife. Given the wide range of values proposed in past studies, and the uncertainties on building characteristics in the study area due to the absence of an exhaustive survey, the wide range of tephra load values proposed in Table 2 is a justified choice. Thus, we associate to all buildings affected by an abundant tephra deposition (level IV or V, Table 2 ) a maximum damage, which corresponds to roof collapse. Given that buildings can also suffer non-structural damages by a moderate ash fallout (hazard level III, Table 2 ), we associate them an intermediate damage value. Finally, in order to account for effects of a scarce ash fallout on building HVAC (heating, ventilation and air conditioning) systems (Wilson et al., 2012) , we associate to it a hazard level II (Table 2) , a low damage level. Tephra fallout can also produce strong impacts on transport infrastructures and urban services. Wilson et al. (2012) describe ash fallout impacts on road infrastructures, water supplies, and the electrical network. Ash deposition up to 1 mm can produce disruptions at roads (Biass et al., 2012; Wilson et al., 2012) and produce several problems and disruptions to the transportation system. In fact, in case of ash the visibility is reduced and the road pavement becomes slippery. The impacts of ash fallout on roads depend on the road type (Table 4) , due to the increased difficulty of driving in low quality (curvy, steep, narrow) roads. We assume that primary roads suffer a very high damage up to 50 cm of ash deposition, whilst the total damage of secondary and bad quality roads is assumed to happen for respectively 10 and 1 cm ash deposition. For all roads, we assume low damage if they are covered by less than 1 mm of ash, whilst for intermediate levels (ash deposition lower than the considered threshold for total damage) we assume medium damage. Volcanic ash also infiltrates HVAC systems, and provokes malfunctioning and stopping of almost every electric and electronic equipment affected, including cars (Wardman et al., 2012a; Wilson et al., 2012) . Urban services can be disrupted by volcanic ash: 1 cm of fine ash deposition can disrupt electricity lines (Wardman et al., 2012a) , whilst a few Table 8 Damage matrix to associate to each hazard (rows) and vulnerability (column) combination a correspondent damage value, varying from I to V, according to Table 7 . Acronym 'n.c.' means that the element has not been considered in the specific case. A colour scale is associated to damage levels. Green colour means no damage or level I damage, whilst yellow identifies damage levels II and III, and orange and red identify respectively damage levels IV and V. I  II  II  III  III  III  III  IV  IV  II  II  II  II  II   II  −  −  −  −  −  II  II  III  III  III  III  III  III  V  V  II  II  II  II  II   III  I  I  I  II  II  III  III  III 
millimetres are sufficient to contaminate water surfaces and open water tanks (Stewart et al., 2006; Wilson et al., 2009) . For this reason, we associate with an ash deposition higher than 1 cm (hazard level higher than III) the total damage of the electricity network (feature types "Ej", "Ep" and "El", see Table 5 ), whilst intermediate damage is associated to lower hazard levels. Also desalination plants ("Wd") can suffer maximum damages in case of abundant ash deposition (hazard level III and higher) and intermediate damages in case of lower magnitude ash fallout, in particular to the electricity network that provides energy to the plant. Surface elements (water canals and tanks, "Wa" and "Wt") can be contaminated by the lowest ash deposition class, which may cause a high or very high damage (level IV and V). Finally, buried elements ("Wc", "Wdn", "Wn", "Sp", "Sc") are expected to suffer strong damages (level IV) only in the case of strong ash fallout, whilst intermediate or low damage can happen in case of weaker ash fallout. Based on these considerations, we associated a functional damage level to each combination of hazard and vulnerability and produced the damage tables showed in Table 8 .
Systemic damage
Damage tables allow associating to each element a value of physical/ functional damage, depending on its vulnerability characteristics and on the magnitude of the hazardous phenomenon. For practical purposes, and in order to facilitate decision-making, it is a common practice to join all maps together in a synthetic map of expected impacts produced by a given hazardous phenomenon. This operation is not straightforward, given that different elements contribute in different ways to the damaging process. Thus, not all vulnerability parameters are equally relevant to the definition of damage. For this reason, damage maps are combined in order to produce a final systemic damage map produced to the system by each hazardous phenomenon. Table 9 shows the weights used to combine the specific damage maps into a final map for each hazardous phenomenon. Vulnerability parameters are intended here as "fragility function attributes" and contribute to the societal impact of a hazardous phenomenon. Weights have been defined according to past studies that documented impacts of volcanic eruptions and their effect on the society and inferred by observations of impact at other active volcanic areas (Blong, 1984 (Blong, , 2003 Baxter et al., 2005; Jenkins et al., 2013) . However, the weight set may change according to the specific context (territorial characteristics, socio-economic conditions, priorities established at a government level, existing risk management plans) and depending on the stakeholders involved in their definition. For this reason, we suggest weights to be defined on an expert knowledge basis. Zuccaro et al. (2008) show that pyroclastic flow occurring at populated areas always produce high-magnitude damage. In this case, the most relevant parameters for the impact assessment are population and the building types (Spence et al., 2005a,b) . The presence of highlyresistant buildings or the adoption of specific building measures, for example reducing and relocating the openings, could in fact partially avoid the occurrence of casualties (Spence et al., 2004 Zuccaro et al., 2008; Jenkins et al., 2013) . Due to the expected gravity of damages produced on population and buildings, the other aspects are given a minor contribution to the estimation of overall expected impacts. Lava flow can produce strong damages on buildings and the population, but their lower velocity (compared to pyroclastic density current, basal surges, lahars and other similar hazards) allows the implementation of response measures such as evacuation/relocation, which can substantially reduce human losses. For this reason, the expected impact on population is lower than that in case of pyroclastic density current, whilst the relevance of other impacts, such as the interruption of roads and urban services, increases. Damage produced by an ash fallout on buildings is mainly related to the roof type (Spence et al., 2005a,b) , which is therefore given a high weight. Also, ash deposition can impact road network and strategic urban services such as electricity and water supply (Wilson et al., 2012) . Finally, vulnerable population can suffer from loss of visibility, eye irritation and respiratory difficulty in case of substantial fallout and remobilization (Horwell and Baxter, 2006) . These impacts are low in magnitude but, combined with other effects of ash deposition, can substantially reduce the response capacity (Biass et al., 2012) and are therefore taken into account. Note that weights given for ash fallout include a large number of parameters, due to the lower (in magnitude) but widespread effects on society (Biass et al., 2012) .
The GIS-based tool
The damage assessment methodology presented here is automated through a GIS-based tool. The inputs of the tool are the results of eruptive scenario simulations, maps of exposed elements and vulnerability characteristics of elements. The tool has been implemented through ModelBuilder (Spatial analysis toolbox, ArcGIS®). Fig. 4 shows a sketch of the methodology, underlining the role of main operations performed before and during the tool work-flow. Initial steps are the definition of eruptive scenario and the collection of vulnerability data (usually provided by national and local authorities). Having defined eruptive scenarios, simulations are performed with the VORIS tool directly from the ArcGIS® interface, and simulation outputs are classified as described in Section 3.1. The exposed elements are also classified according to the physical vulnerability parameters defined. Then, the tool produces systemic vulnerability maps multiplying each element by the corresponding coefficient (Table 6 ) and overlaps the specific vulnerability maps with the maps of modelling results (reclassified as in Table 2 ), for each phenomenon. This operation is supported by the damage tables (Table 8 ) that contain a damage value for each combination of hazard and vulnerability. The resulting damage maps are then combined according to the relative importance of the parameters for the damage assessment ( Table 9) .
The 6 main operations implemented in the tool are:
1) Conversion from vector to raster. Vector maps of exposed elements have to be converted to raster format, all with the same cell size and extension. Results are the thematic raster map for all vulnerability parameters. For example, a raster map containing the information for each pixel for the "path quality" parameter is obtained from the vectorial map of roads. 2) Application of coefficients to account for systemic vulnerability.
Every thematic vulnerability map is multiplied by the systemic vulnerability coefficients (Table 6 ) on a cell-by-cell basis. This procedure allows taking into account the relative importance of each element of the system (Section 3.3.5). In this way, a cell that hosts multiple features is considered multiple times. 3) GIS-based overlap. In the field of risk management, damage is defined as the product, or spatial overlap, of hazard and vulnerability characteristics. The core of the damage assessment is therefore an overlap of hazardous phenomena and thematic vulnerability maps. This operation is performed on a cell-by-cell basis, using the damage tables (Table 8 ) to associate to each combination of hazard and vulnerability a qualitative damage value. Results are thematic damage maps for each hazardous phenomenon and infrastructural subsystem. In particular, for urban services, given that the elements are both points and lines and are stored in separated vector maps, the converted raster have been combined through a mosaic technique in order to select the maximum vulnerability index for each cell (mosaic method, data management toolbox, ArcGIS®). 4) Reclassification. Every time a numerical operation is performed over a map, or two maps are combined together, a reclassification is necessary in order to maintain a qualitative classification (for example, the 5-classes qualitative classification for damage). This is performed automatically by the system, which divides the total value into constant intervals or natural breaks (Jenks, 1967) . 5) Weighted sum. Weighting operations consists in a multiplication between a raster containing the weights values and the thematic map. Thematic impact for each combination of hazardous phenomenon and vulnerability indicator are combined independently for each hazardous phenomenon, accounting for the relevance of each vulnerability indicator (Table 9) for the final damage assessment (Section 3.5). Vulnerability indicators are intended here as "fragility function attributes" as described in Section 3.5. 6) The final step of the tool consists in producing a final impact map taking the maximum damage produced, for each element, by the hazardous phenomena considered in the eruptive scenario. Thus, thematic damage maps for each scenario (for example, ash fallout and lava flow for scenario II) are combined into a final damage map for the eruptive scenario, showing the distribution of expected impacts in the area.
All operations can be managed and controlled by the user. The complete work-flow can be visualised through the ArcGIS® interface and most parameters of the tool are set on a default value and are customizable: for example, the 0.1% probability taken as threshold for lava flow coverage can be changed by the user, based on the expected characteristics of the flow and the reliability of simulation models. Also the cell size used for the spatial analysis operations can be changed, according to the resolution of the topographical data used for the simulation of lava and pyroclastic flow. Given that the vectorial maps have an intrinsic high resolution, and in order to perform a high-resolution analysis, we adopt a default cell size of 10 m. Cell size is kept constant during the analysis, in order to ensure that the spatial analysis is implemented between equal or comparable grids. All input parameters are introduced before launching the tool, through a pop-up window. Tables and maps  can be 
Results
In this Section we present final damage maps produced for the two simulated scenarios in the area of Icod de los Vinos. Fig. 5 (top) shows systemic damage maps expected to be produced by the eruptive scenario 1 by the multiple hazardous phenomena: phonolitic lava flow (a), ash fallout (b) and pyroclastic density current (c). Lava flow (Fig. 5a ) I is expected to produce low to moderate impacts on the population and high impacts on roads and the main electricity network, whilst ash fallout (Fig. 5b) can cause high impacts on roads, and the electricity and water supply network. Pyroclastic density current (Fig. 5c ) can produce high impacts on the population, especially in highly populated areas, and strongly damage strategic buildings. Fig. 5d shows the combination of specific damage maps into a total damage map, result of the weighted overlap of thematic maps (Section 4 and Table 9 ). showing that high impacts are expected for two highly populated areas (corresponding to the main urban nuclei of San Juan de la Rambla and Icod de los Vinos). Also the main electricity network is expected to suffer high impacts, whilst medium and high damage can happen at secondary and minor roads. Fig. 5 (bottom) shows damage maps produced for the eruptive scenario 2 by basaltic lava flow (5e) and ash fallout (5f), that are expected to produce low to moderate impacts on population and high impacts on roads, and the electricity and water supply network. The combination of the two maps in a final damage map is showed in Fig. 5g . Fig. 6 shows examples of expected damage maps produced by the ash fallout simulation from eruptive scenario 1, obtained varying the weights of vulnerability parameters (edifices, roads and urban services, respectively). For clarity purposes, the population was not included, in order to underline the effects of weights on the considered features. Fig. 6a is produced by giving the set of weight coherent to the one adopted for the analysis, that is, higher weight to edifices and equal weight to urban services and roads (Table 9 , column 3). With this weight set, a higher concern is posed on impacts at buildings, that is, on the resident population. The weight given on the edifices may also change with time. In general, at night most people are located in residential buildings, whilst during the day few strategical buildings (schools, factories and public offices) host a high percentage of the population. Weights can also reflect seasonal variability and account Fig. 4 . Sketch of the methodology, underlining the role of main operations performed before and during the tool work-flow. The first operations are performed out of the work-flow (simulation of eruptive scenarios, exposure analysis and production physical vulnerability maps). Then, the tool produces reclassified maps for each hazardous scenario, systemic vulnerability and, through a GIS-based overlap, thematic damage maps. Finally, damage maps are combined in order to produce systemic damage maps for each hazardous phenomenon, and a final map for each eruptive scenario. for the higher importance of buildings for sheltering in place during winter. Fig. 6b is produced by giving a very high weight to buildings (0.6) which may correspond to a situation in which the population has to shelter in place. This decision, in fact, assumes that buildings are a safe place for the population. Finally, Fig. 6c is produced giving a higher weight to roads (0.5), and may correspond to a risk management strategy in which the transportation network has a primary role, such as during an evacuation. Also, roads are important in case of sheltering in place, in order to bring first-aid supplies (water, medicines, food) to impacted areas. The comparison of the systemic damage maps (Fig. 6a , b,c) shows how different weighs can influence results. For example, in map 6b, where a very high weight is given to buildings, minor roads (black arrow in Fig. 6a and b) do not appear to suffer a high damage, whilst in Fig. 6c minor roads are visible and their damage is emphasized by the higher weight given to the road network. At the same time, strategic features such as main electricity lines always have a high damage (blue arrow in Fig. 6c) .
Finally, for each scenario, we performed a first-level quantification of expected impacts. Together with the final damage map, buildings and urban services can be displayed in order to identify areas that are potentially impacted and recognize the specific features. For example, one may identify strategic buildings (for example, hospital and health care centres) or main roads suffering higher damage. We consider cells where a very high or high damage is found (damage classes IV or V) and infer the expected impacts on main exposed assets. Table 10 shows expected impacts from the two eruptive scenarios on the total study area and for each municipality. We estimated the number of strategic buildings and productive sites expected to suffer damages, the length of road network impacted, and in particular the impact on highways, and the length of main electricity lines that are likely to suffer impacts. Both scenarios 1 and 2 are expected to impact many strategical buildings. In particular, a high impact is expected at 3 hospitals in Icod de los Vinos municipality, two of them located within the Icod urban area (Fig. 3b) , and the only documented fire station in the area, located in San Juan de la Rambla (Fig. 3b) . The desalination plant in San Juan de la Rambla municipality (Fig. 3b) can suffer low impact due to weak ash deposition from scenario 1, but is not directly affected by lava and pyroclastic flow, whilst the desalination plant located in the Icod de los Vinos municipality (Fig. 3b) can be directly affected by lava flow from the basaltic rift, and is therefore expected to suffer high damages. Finally, scenario 1 is expected to impact approximately 26 km of electricity network and 35 km primary road network, 8 km being part of the main highway, whilst scenario 2 is expected to produce less impacts on the electricity and road network. Fig. 6 . Intermediate maps of impact caused by ash fallout on the total system, obtained by combined thematic maps of buildings, roads and urban services. Maps are produced by varying the weight set, in order to show the effects of weights on total results. a shows the resulting impact map obtained by giving a weight of 4, 3, and 3 respectively to buildings, roads and urban services, whilst for b and c tuples of values were respectively 2, 2, and 6 and 2, 5, and 3. Here, for explanation purposes, we did not include population in the analysis. Weights used for the analysis (including population) are shown in Table 9 .
Table 10
Expected impacts of the eruptive scenarios on main exposed targets. 6. Discussion
Improvement of current database
The methodology presented here was adapted to the available data, which were gathered in different surveys during the last decade, and without the specific aim of performing a systemic vulnerability assessment. We do not perform a comprehensive exposure and vulnerability analysis but, given its importance for a comprehensive risk assessment, we suggest indicators that may be included in a further survey. We therefore suggest a set of complementary data that may be gathered to enhance the methodology. Table 11 presents our proposal for an ideal, complete database which contains the useful data for a comprehensive vulnerability and exposure assessment, that could be used in the study area or in other zones threatened by volcanic hazard. If such data were included, the GIS based tool could support risk management and cost-benefit analysis, that should be integrated in volcanic risk management (Barsotti et al., 2010; Sandri et al., 2011; Marzocchi et al., 2012) .
Population characteristics (e.g. age, language, health conditions, literacy) may be particularly relevant, given the strong presence of foreign tourists and residents. Another important source of information is the availability of emergency infrastructure and equipment (e.g. helicopters, electricity generators, water, food and medical equipment) and conditions of the strategic buildings (e.g. hospitals, schools, fire stations, industrial plants). Also, the importance of productive activities for the socio-economic system could be estimated by indicators such as income per capita at specific areas and for productive sectors, regional/local productivity, number of employees, etc. This analysis would allow identifying productive sites that may be highly vulnerable in case of an emergency. Population and socio-economic data are usually collected for the whole island, and were not available at a disaggregated level (municipality or lower) during this work. This is a common issue when dealing with territorial exposure and vulnerability data (Scaini et al., 2014) . Regarding the built environment, we consider that the classification proposed by Spence is adequate to support a comprehensive risk assessment. Nonetheless, we suggest that the classification proposed in Martí et al. (2008a) can be complemented including an indicator of maintenance (not currently available), which may allow recognising those buildings that, although having good structural characteristics, are poorly maintained and need mitigation measures to prevent unexpected collapses. This aspect underlines the temporal dimension of vulnerability, which can increase as elements become older or poorly maintained. The indicator of maintenance could be easily updated over years and improve the usability of old surveys. The systemic vulnerability coefficient for road infrastructure is based on road types, but it would be important to characterise the main traffic components (residents, touristic, commercial) in order to perform a complete analysis. In particular, traffic data could be a proxy for population flow (daily movements between, for example, residential to productive areas) and support the definition of weights to account for time-dependency of systemic impacts (Sections 3.5 and 55). The design speed of the road would also be a good indicator of its characteristics, given that modern design codes for roads and transportation infrastructures as the AASHTO design code are based on this concept. Road design and traffic data were not available for this work, but could be included in this analysis. Finally, Table 6 points out the importance of the physical characteristics of elements that constitute the urban services. The classification of urban service types (Table 5) is based on the general characteristics of elements, focusing on those that strongly increase or decrease their vulnerability. For example, a critical parameter for physical vulnerability of infrastructures is if they are buried or not, in particular from ash fallout impacting water supplies Wilson et al., 2009 Wilson et al., , 2012 . In theory, the characteristics of water supply and sanitation pipes are established in the national building code, but existing elements may have an obsolete or poor design. At the moment, there are no specific studies on the physical damage suffered by buried infrastructures (water supply, electricity supply, urban drainage) in the case of pyroclastic flow and lava flow coverage. Moreover, this characteristic is not present in many of the vulnerability surveys, included the one used in this work, and should be included in the future, as also suggested by Jenkins et al. (2014) . The implementation of mitigation measures, such as burying critical infrastructures, could protect exposed assets from some of the volcanic phenomena, and therefore reduce their vulnerability. This is particularly valid for ash fallout. This indicator could therefore drive mitigation measures and risk reduction actions at active volcanic areas. Other relevant information that is nowadays missing is a functional classification of the urban service network. The design of the elements and service networks is in fact a key factor in order to improve the impact assessment and increase resilience of the system. For example, knowing the number of people supplied by a single element of the network, for example a main pipe or a water tank, would improve preparedness. For example, Wilson et al. (2009 Wilson et al. ( , 2012 suggest mitigation measures in order to reduce the vulnerability to tephra fallout, and argue that a correct and more resilient design of urban systems can reduce the impacts of tephra fallout. Such data that would support the definition of systemic vulnerability coefficients (Table 6 ) and the estimation of impacts on population. The physical and systemic vulnerability classification adopted in this analysis introduces strong simplifications but allows a first-level damage assessment, hypothesising the worst-case physical characteristics of the elements (i.e., open air) and taking into account the relevance of infrastructural systems and elements. Moreover, systemic damage maps for each hazardous phenomena are combined by taking the maximum damage value, in order to be conservative. This method avoids underestimating expected impacts and accounts for the fact that a maximum damage level can be reached instantaneously (for example in case of PDC). Finally, the vulnerability classification presented here was designed to be easily changed if the situation requires an update.
Methodology
The impact assessment methodology proposed here allows including infrastructural systems (roads and urban services) in the vulnerability assessment and offers a simplified way to perform an impact assessment that comprehends many volcanic hazards and infrastructural elements. In particular, ash fallout does not only produce physical damages, but also strong systemic impacts. In fact, the disruption of urban services and road infrastructure is likely to affect the functionality of other strategic elements such as hospitals and fire stations. Here, we attempt to consider this aspect by using the systemic vulnerability coefficients. Similarly to Jenkins et al. (2014) , the attention is being posed on the role of the infrastructural system during an emergency, and the analysis is mostly qualitative. Nonetheless, this aspect is complemented with an estimation of expected impacts on critical infrastructures, which may support more quantitative analysis for the study area considered. The use of systemic vulnerability coefficients allows emphasizing the role of a given infrastructure or asset, according to its importance for the whole socio-economic system. Given that this is very difficult to assess, and that it can vary from case to case, we strongly suggest the participation of public and private stakeholders (national authorities, private companies, citizens, etc.) in the definition of the systemic vulnerability coefficient, in order to produce more usable and reliable results. The importance of stakeholder participation is also pointed out in Fig. 4 . The methodology, in fact, is based on vulnerability data, that are usually provided by local and national government. But, given that stakeholders can be both managers and/or users of services and infrastructures, they could provide data to enhance the definition of vulnerability, in particular the socio-economic dimension.
Population is included in the damage assessment, being considered as an exposed target, and having its vulnerability characteristics (Fig. 3a) . On one hand, including the population gives a better perception of how much the society is involved in the damage process. On the other hand, population surveys for low administrative units (such as homogeneous areas displayed in Fig. 1) are not always available. In particular, if this methodology were applied to a bigger study area, population could be included directly in the final step of damage assessment, estimating the number of people expected to be impacted for the whole study area. Examples of impact maps for which, for clarity purposes, we did not consider population, are included in Fig. 6 .
In order to produce final, synthetic maps, the tool combines thematic damage maps produced for specific subsystems (Section 3.5). Specific physical damage maps for population, buildings, roads and urban services are combined within the tool using a weighting process (Section 4). The weighting process allows producing specific damage maps focused on the stakeholders priorities, and the tool allows the user to introduce and change these weights. Fig. 6 shows maps of expected damage produced by the ash fallout of scenario 1, obtained by varying the set of weights used for combining different thematic damage maps. Maps show that weights can be used to emphasize aspects of particular interest or that are recognized to be critical for the response in case of volcanic eruption. Fig. 6 shows that weights can be used to emphasize aspects of particular interest or that are recognized to be critical for the response in case of volcanic eruption, and underline the importance of using a balanced set of weights whilst combining different damage maps. Different sets of weights could support specific societal circumstances. For example, in case of evacuation, the road network has a strong relevance for the emergency management procedures, and would therefore be given a higher weight. Also, specific asset managers, such as water and electricity distribution companies, may focus on impacts on the infrastructure under their jurisdiction, rather than on edifices and roads. Here, we do not explore all possible combinations of weights, but we use three examples that may correspond to practical situations. These examples allow showing the strong variability of the tool output and underline the importance of performing a probabilistic hazard and impact assessment in the future. Last but not least, the use of weights, that can be strongly subjective, increases the "bias" on the methodology results. Also, the cultural and geographical context influences the choice of the weight set to be adopted. If this methodology and tool were to be applied in an operational context, weights should be defined by a heterogeneous group of experts, local authorities and stakeholders. The definition of an "a priori" set of weights could be useful to improve societal response. Elicitation techniques (Aspinall, 2006) and other knowledge integration methods are suitable, and would lead to identify the best combination, in order to reach the synthesis of information without losing important aspects and elements. Having clear priorities and criteria for decision, and having them integrated in the model, the results could be of easier interpretation.
It is worth noticing that the methodology relies on the hazard assessment, which may be improved by applying probabilistic techniques (Newhall and Hoblitt, 2002; Marzocchi et al., 2004; Sobradelo et al., 2011) in order to produce statistically valid results and support decision-making (Sandri et al., 2011) . In the case of Tenerife, such techniques were applied (Martí et al., 2008b; Sobradelo et al., 2011) but haven't been systematically adopted for emergency management and long-term territorial planning, The work presented here poses the basis for probabilistic impact assessment that may be developed in the future.
Moreover, the modelling of hazardous phenomena and GIS-based analysis has an associated uncertainty (Renschler, 2005) . In particular, tephra dispersal modelling relies on many assumptions on the volcanological parameters and their uncertainty (Scollo et al., 2008; Biass and Bonadonna, 2011) . Here, tephra fallout impacts are estimated on the definition of tephra load thresholds that can vary depending on tephra characteristics. Particle shape is in fact used by most tephra fallout models for the calculation of the settling velocity of each particle class (Costa et al., 2006) . Also, particle shape can influence the thickness of distal deposit and affect its compactness (Riley et al., 2003) . Particle shape and density can influence physical parameters such as abrasiveness and electrical resistivity of ash, and subsequent impacts of ash fallout on electricity network and related equipments (Wardman et al., 2012a,b; Wilson et al., 2012) . In this work, we are considering ash load values from VORIS modelling output (Table 2) , and do not depend on density and shape, but such parameters are relevant if impact assessment is based on ash deposition thickness.
Finally, the methodology could be improved by integrating other hazards for a comprehensive risk management of volcanic eruptions, e.g. including secondary damages produced by seismic activity. Volcanogenic seismic activity is often associated with volcanic events and has been considered in similar works such as Pomonis et al. (1999) , Spence et al. (2005a) , Zuccaro et al. (2008) and Jenkins et al. (2014) and included in the ENSURE multi-hazard vulnerability assessment. Moreover, explosive volcanic eruption can produce large pyroclastic deposits, often unconsolidated, that can be easily remobilised by heavy rainfalls and produce lahars. Landslides can also be triggered by volcanogenic earthquakes. All these aspects should be included in a comprehensive risk assessment of the study area, which is highly prone to the occurrence of such phenomena. Moreover, the identification of relationships between infrastructural systems and productive activities, as performed by Jenkins et al. (2014) for agricultural activities and infrastructures, can support the assessment of socio-economic impacts. Finally, the integration with network analysis tools for the analysis of the transportation systems and people mobility would improve the methodology and enhance their applicability to real systems (Ronan et al., 2000) . In the future, we wish to include these aspects, to improve the knowledge of the system behaviour and response.
The GIS-based tool
This work underlines the power of GIS for data management and analysis. The development of an automatic model to perform spatial analysis allows one to reduce computing times and human error. The user can interact with the tool and choose to visualize specific results, for example executing only one part of the work-flow and visualizing a specific map (i.e. the damage map produced by an ash fallout event on buildings). Moreover, the user can change damage tables and weights and repeat the process, in order to make the process as adaptable as possible to the new knowledge.
The GIS-based model presented in this paper provides damage scenarios containing a cell-by-cell evaluation of the damage level. Although the conversion from vector to raster maps can increase the error, the cell-based approach allows one to underline the precise location of the damage and, at the same time, perform spatial analysis operations. Results of the higher-resolution damage assessment can be contextualized by the multi-layered visualization of other thematic maps, such as vectorial maps of roads and buildings, digital elevation maps and population data. This instrument can therefore support the end user in defining emergency strategies. The GIS-based model presented here may therefore be applied to analogous analysis in other active volcanic areas. One limitation of the tool is that it is necessary to supply maps containing the specific fields used by the tool. For this reason, the user has to make sure that data are stored in the format required by the tool, which may require additional time. This is an inconvenience, but it is due to the fact that there is still no common standard for vulnerability assessment in the field of volcanic risk. The introduction of the ENSURE framework may be a step towards a common classification for vulnerability, with the aim of enhancing interoperability between local vulnerability databases. Moreover, Table 11 suggests a possible scheme for data gathering and storage, which may be used as a common format for such kind of analyses and support the creation of an exposure and vulnerability spatial database.
The case-study
This work does not attempt to produce a long-term hazard assessment for the study area, but considers two eruptive scenarios likely to occur at the Teide-Pico Viejo volcanic complex. The methodology presented here may therefore be applied for other eruptive scenarios resulting from a comprehensive hazard assessment, if available in the future. It is also worth noticing that we assumed a conservative threshold for the probability of coverage (0.1%) in order to produce a map of lava coverage, which may be changed by the user based on hazard assessment and risk management considerations. Moreover, impacts produced by ash fallout are amplified by the presence of rain (Macedonio and Costa, 2011) , which can increase the ash load due to the presence of water and therefore increase the probability of roof collapse. Also, the conductivity of the water-ash mixture is higher than dry ash. Finally, wet ash on roads pavements can produce stronger disruptions on traffic. This aspect should be taken into account during volcanic eruptions in the study area as it can be relevant for response during emergencies.
The results of the systemic damage assessment (Fig. 5 and Table 10) show that scenario 1 can produce high impacts on population, especially at highly populated areas, mainly due to pyroclastic density current (Fig. 5c ) and is likely to damage electricity network and roads. Due to their high expected impact and their relevance for the socio-economic system, urban areas impacted (Fig. 5d) can be considered as societal hot-spots. Impact assessment results (Table 10) show that many strategical buildings, including not only three hospitals and a fire station, but also schools, religious sites and industrial plants, can be impacted. In particular, the fire station, 2 hospitals and 9 of the impacted schools fall within the urban nuclei of Santa Barbara and Buen Paso (eastern boundary of Icod de los Vinos municipality) and La Guancha (Fig. 1c) . These areas can be identified as societal hot-spots that, in case of the occurrence of scenario 1, are likely to suffer high impacts on all the socio-economic system. Scenario 2 is expected to produce lower impacts on population, but can impact roads and infrastructures. It should therefore be taken into account because, although it does produce lower impacts, it has a higher probability of occurrence (Martí et al., 2008a) . The analysis of Fig. 5 and its comparison with existing exposure and vulnerability data allows one to identify areas that have a higher expected societal impact, and where mitigation measures are required. For example, the towns of La Vega and San Juan de la Rambla (Fig. 1c) , located in the western part of Icod de los Vinos municipality, can suffer high damages in case of the occurrence of Scenario 2 (Fig. 5g) . The results of the impact assessment (Table 10) show that, unless scenario 2 is not expected to impact population directly, it can affect strategical buildings (schools religious sites, industrial plants). In particular, only one of the impacted schools is located in the highly impacted urban area of La Vega. Finally, it is worth noticing that both scenarios are likely to impact the road network, whose
Conclusions
We presented a methodology that allows estimating expected impacts produced by volcanic activity on a complex anthropic system. The existing vulnerability analysis for the building stock was complemented with the vulnerability assessment of the road network and infrastructures, based on available data provided by local authorities. Having defined qualitative levels of damage, we proposed damage tables for the assignation of expected damage to each element, based on its hazard and vulnerability characteristics. We then designed a GISbased tool to automate the damage assessment methodology and produce volcanic damage scenarios in a simple, friendly, and fast way. The aim of this tool is to facilitate the task of territorial planners and risk managers when dealing with active volcanic areas.
The methodology has been applied to the study area of Icod de los Vinos, San Juan de la Rambla and La Guancha municipalities, set in a highly hazardous area close to Teide-Pico Viejo volcanic complex, on Tenerife. Three eruptive scenarios have been defined, one for each hazardous phenomena, and modelled using the VORIS analytical tool. Having estimated the vulnerability characteristics of the system, we produced impact maps for each eruptive scenario. It is important to provide first-level damage scenarios, as low-complexity maps with synthetic information can facilitate the decision makers in the first hours of the volcanic event. Results allow identifying the critical areas that are likely to suffer physical damages and provoke systemic impacts. The methodology presented here can therefore improve preparedness and support risk management plans for the area. The proposed tool can be a useful instrument, especially if, as we recommend, it is integrated with more specific emergency systems, such as monitoring and alert. Moreover, the integration of these results with other long-term estimations of hazard and vulnerability can enhance the risk management of this area.
